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"Good Faith" as a Defense to Suits for Police
Deprivations of Individual Rights
William H. Theis*
The citizen who seeks redress for alleged excesses by the
police encounters many hurdles set in his way by legislatures and
courts sympathetic to the government officers who form the
front-line defense against crime.1 Nor, for that matter, have
juries been particularly responsive to tales of unlawful official
behavior placed before them by plaintiffs who are themselves
often of suspect background and appearance.2 Recently, some
courts have begun to fashion still another doctrine which diminishes the plaintiff's opportunity to recover money damages for
unlawful police conduct: a gradually increasing number of
courts-including the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, as
evidenced by two recent opinions 3-allow the police officer the
defense that he thought his questioned actions to be lawful. This
defense, dispensing as it does with an objective evaluation of
police conduct, gives the police officer a durable shield against
charges of misconduct. In an age when we are reminded so
frequently of the "technicalities" forced on the police by the
Warren Court, almost any claim of subjective good faith made by
a police officer has a certain aura of plausibility. Thoughtful
consideration, however, proves this new doctrine to be both illfounded and misguided.
THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF THE COmmON LAw: IGNoRANcE
OF THE LAW

Is No EXCUSE

At common law, the citizen deprived of personal or property
rights had a variety of trespass actions available for use against
the offending law enforcement officer. So also the law fashioned
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual

Rights, 39 MNm. L. REv. 493 (1955).

2. See, e.g., Joseph v. Rowlen, 425 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1970) (district court verdict of liability, but no damages for innocent salesman arrested on charge of unlawful soliciting, upheld on appeal).
3. Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974); Bell v. Wolff,
496 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1974).
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certain privileges under which the officer might justify his conduct and thereby escape liability. This Article will not dissect or
catalogue the content of these privileges in various jurisdictions
over the long history of the common law.4 Rather, it will elaborate on one theme: in applying these privileges, the law has
always employed an objective standard. The officer must have
acted within the rules; he may not later seek to justify his
actions, otherwise illegal, by claiming ignorance of their illegality. He must establish his privilege to act as he did, not his belief
that he was so privileged. Otherwise, as is so readily apparent,
every officer would become his own measure of the law which
confers certain rights on the citizenry. Ignorance by others of
those rights has never been held to render them nonexistent.
Consideration of Entick v. Carrington,5 the headwaters of
Anglo-American search-and-seizure law, 6 illustrates the unquestioned proposition that officers of the law must find their justification for claimed abuses in the objective standards of the law. In
that case, -the plaintiff sued in trespass certain messengers of the
king who had broken into his house and carried off his books and
papers pursuant to a general warrant issued by the secretary of
state., In affirming a verdict for the plaintiff, Lord Camden
established the limits of the court's inquiry:
No man can set his foot upon my ground without my license
....
If he admits the fact, he is bound to shew by way of
justification, that some positive law has empowered or excused
him. The justification is submitted to the judges, who are to
look into the books; and if such a justification can be maintained by the text of the statute law, or by the principles of
common law. If no such excuse can be found or produced, the
silence of the books is an authority
against the defendant, and
7
the plaintiff must have judgment.

4. For authoritative statements in this area, one should consult 1
F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 1.19, 3.17-.19 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAmEs]; W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTs §§ 25-26 (4th ed. 1971). See also Note, Liability of an Officer
for Making an Arrest, 51 L.R.A. 193 (1901).
5. 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
6. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-30 (1886); Fisher
v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 1, 28-29 (1854).
7. 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066. Accord, Pettijohn v. Smith, 255 Ark.
780, 502 S.W.2d 618 (1973). The Entick court's further remarks illustrate
the common law's grudging attitude toward the proliferation of privileges in trespass cases:
Where is the written law that gives any magistrate such a
power [to issue general warrants]? I can safely answer, there
is none...
But though it cannot be maintained by any direct law, yet
it bears a resemblance, as was urged, to the known case of search
and seizure for stolen goods.
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In ruling that general warrants issued by the secretary violated
the plaintiff's legal rights, the court discounted any consideration
of the defendants' perceived need for obedience to a superior's
orders.8 Nor, for that matter, did similar blanket searches and
seizures in the past detract from the illegality of the process
purporting to authorize the defendants' acts.9 After an exhaustive inquiry, the court concluded that general warrants such as
those executed by the defendants were illegal and invasions of
the plaintiff's rights. Since the law did not recognize the validity of general warrants, those warrants offered no justification
for the defendants' actions and thus made the officers liable for
trespass. The objective standards of the law, and not the defendants' perception of the law, would have afforded them their
only defense to the wrong inflicted on the plaintiff. 0
The case of searching for stolen goods crept into the law by

imperceptible practice. It is the only case of the kind that is to
be met with. No less a person than my Lord Coke. . . denied
its legality; and therefore [even] if the two cases resembled each
other more than they do, we have no right, without an act of
parliament, to adopt a new practice in the criminal law, which
was never yet allowed from all antiquity.
19 How. St. Tr. at 1066-67.
8. 19 How. St. Tr. at 1065. Accord, Christ v. McDonald, 152 Ore.
494, 52 P.2d 655 (1955).
9. 19 How. St. Tr. at 1067-68.
10. Since Entick, the English courts have continued to take a rigorous view of the defense of justification in tort suits against police officers. In Hoye v. Bush, 133 Eng. Rep. 545 (C.P. 1840), defendant officers
arrested plaintiff under a warrant for one John Hoye. The plaintiff's
Christian name was Richard, John being his father. It appeared from
the evidence that Richard, the plaintiff, was the party whom the warrant-issuing magistrate intended to have arrested, although John was the
name which appeared on the warrant. The court held the plea of justification to be insufficient: a warrant justifies the arrest only of the person named therein.
To similar effect is Christie v. Leachinsky, [1947] A.C. 573, where
the House of Lords found that a false arrest had occurred when officers
failed to inform plaintiff of the charges for which they took him into
custody.
If a policeman who entertained a reasonable suspicion that X.
has committed a felony were at liberty to arrest him and march
him off to a police station without giving any explanation of why
he was doing this, the prima facie right of liberty would be
gravely infringed. No on% I think, would approve a situation
in which when the person arrested asked for the reason, the policeman replied "that has nothing to do with you; come along
with me." Such a situation may be tolerated under other systems
of law, as for instance in the time of lettres de cachet in the
eighteenth century in France, or in more recent days when the
Gestapo swept people off to confinement under an overriding
authority which the executive in this country happily does not
in ordinary times possess. This would be quite contrary to our
conceptions of individual liberty.
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A nineteenth century American case emphasizes the continuing vitality of this principle. Campbell v. Sherman" exemplifies
the common law's concern that a citizen illegally deprived of his
rights should be able to obtain redress notwithstanding the subjective state of mind of the police official. In that case, the
defendant sheriff had made an in rem seizure of the plaintiff's
vessel pursuant to process issued by a state court. Under previous
decisions by the United States Supreme Court,' 2 such a seizure,
although authorized by state law,' 3 violated the United States
Constitution. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a judgment
against the sheriff for conversion in spite of his claim that he did
not know such a seizure to be unconstitutional, saying "[y] et it is
manifest that if ignorance of the law were a ground of exemption, the administration of justice would be arrested, and society
could not exist. For in every case ignorance of the law would be
alleged."' 4 Harsh as the result may seem,' 5 the plaintiff's property had been illegally seized, and the sheriff was obliged to pay for
his mistaken, yet harmful action.' 6
Id. at 588.
Wiltshire v. Barrett, [1966] 1 Q.B. 312 (C.A. 1965), did grant the police a somewhat broader power to arrest than a literal reading of the
statute in question in that case would seem to suggest. That statute allowed arrest without warrant of a person "committing" the offense of
driving while unfit to drive because of drunkenness. In the absence of
actual drunken driving, the court approved a plea of justification where
the defendant officers had a reasonable belief that the plaintiff was committing the offense. Nonetheless, the court's opinion is clear that only
a reasonable belief in guilt, not an honest belief in guilt, satisfies the
defendant's burden of proof.
11. 35 Wis. 103 (1874).
12. E.g., The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1867).
13. In Campbell, the applicable state law was Wis. Laws 1869, ch.
184.
14. 35 Wis.at 110.
15. "But if the officer does not wish to assume all the hazard...
he must require a bond of indemnity from the party for whom he is
acting." Id.
16. Accord, Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 156 Ga. 789, 120 S.E. 120
(1923); Sumner v. Beeler, 50 Ind. 341 (1875); Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky.
981 (1820); Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 1 (1854); Judson v.
Reardon, 16 Minn. 387 (1870); cf. Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
331 (1806); Merritt v. St. Paul, 11 Minn. 145 (1866). Contra, Morrill
v. Hamel, 337 Mass. 83, 148 N.E.2d 283 (1958); Brooks v. Mangan, 86
Mich. 576, 49 N.W. 633 (1891). Rapacz, Protection of Officers Who Act
Under Unconstitutional Statutes, 11 Mwnn. L. REV. 585 (1927), argues in
support of the minority position: if judges are protected when they act
under unconstitutional statutes, so also should police officers be protected.
The law on seizure of goods under process bristles with refinements
not at all keyed to the officer's honesty or subjective good faith. For
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To the same effect is Malcolmson v. Scott,17 in which the
Michigan Supreme Court reversed and remanded a judgment for
the officers in an action against police officers who had arrested
an innocent man pursuant to an informal communication from
law enforcement authorities in another state. While recognizing
the officers' narrow privilege to arrest a person without a warrant if they had reasonable grounds to believe he had committed
a felony,'8 the court chastised the officers for acting on informaexample,
is liable.
however,
1 HARPER

if he seizes the goods of a person not named in his writ, he
If he seizes goods of the person named in his writ, including,
goods immune by law from process, he is liable for his trespass.
& JAMES, supra note 4, § 2.44, at 207 & nn.10-11. English law

is equally detailed and exacting.

§§ 1997-2053 (13th ed. 1969).

See J. CLERK & W. LINDSELL, TORTS

17. 56 Mich. 459, 23 N.W. 166 (1885).
18. See Beckwith v. Philby, 6 Barn. & Cress. 635, 108 Eng. Rep. 585
(K.B. 1827), and Samuel v. Payne, 1 Doug. 359, 99 Eng. Rep. 230 (K.B.
1780), for early statements of this rule. See also 1 HARPER & JAMES,
supra note 4, § 3.18, at 277-78, and RESTATEmET (SECOND) OF TORTS §
121(b) (1965), for a more recent formulation. It is clear that the officer
may escape liability only when reasonable mistakes as to the existence
of certain facts lead him to arrest the wrong person. However,
an officer is not privileged to arrest another whom he reasonably
suspects of having committed an act which the officer, through
a mistake of law reasonable in one of his position, believes to
be a common law felony. So too, a peace officer is not privileged to arrest another whom he reasonably suspects of having
committed an act which the officer, through a mistaken construction of a statute, believes to have been made a felony by such
statute and this is true although the reasonable character of the
officer's mistake is proved by the fact that at the time of the arrest the statute is generally understood to make such an act a
felony and is not judicially construed to the contrary until after
the arrest is made.
Id., comment i. At common law, arrests for most misdemeanors could
be made only under warrant. This rule applied to peace officers as well

as to private citizens. Id., comment h.
The right of a private citizen without warrant to arrest for a completed felony is even more circumscribed than a peace officer's. For the
former to make a lawful arrest, the felony for which he arrests must
actually have occurred. If no felony has occurred, no amount of reasonable belief will exonerate the actor. Id. § 119.
Further, "[n]ot only must the act of which the actor suspects the
other have been committed, but the act must be a felony. The fact that
an act has been committed and that the actor through a mistake of law
or fact reasonably believes such act to be a felony does not give him
any privilege to arrest another whom he knows or reasonably suspects
of having committed the act ....

Thus, where the other has stolen a

watch worth a dollar and so committed a misdemeanor, the actor who
knows of such theft is not privileged to arrest the other for it, although
he believes the watch is of the value of fifty dollars, in which case a
felony would have been committed, or mistakenly believes that the theft
of even a dollar watch is a felony. Id., comment i.
The foregoing should emphasize that the rules of privilege are highly
detailed and specific. There is no general rule of reason or reasonable
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tion much too vague to form such a reasonable belief as to the
arrestee's guilt. Since they did not bring their conduct within the
objective standards of that privilege as administered by the
court, they had no justification for their acts. More importantly,
the court commented on another aspect of the case that emphasized the need to act within a privilege to arrest. The court ruled
out any justification based on arrest for extradition, since there
had been no compliance with the state's extradition statutes.
Certain rules for arrest prior to extradition had been set up; if
these were not followed, the arrestee's detention would not be
justified. 19 In the court's words, "an officer of justice is bound to
2
know what the law is."
o The penalty for not knowing the law

was liability for trespass.
These cases, requiring objective compliance with the strict
privileges accorded by the law, must be sharply distinguished
from situations such as that in Rush v. Buckley, 21 where the
defendant officer arrested the plaintiff under a warrant charging
him with violation of a municipal ordinance. After his conviction,
plaintiff brought suit, claiming his arrest to be illegal because the
ordinance for whose violation he had been arrested had never
been promulgated and hence was a nullity. Thus, he argued, his
arrest for acts not technically a crime was illegal. Recognizing
and distinguishing one of its precedents in accord with Campbell
v. Sherman,22 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the
belief. As in the case of the private citizen who makes an arrest, no
amount of reasonable belief will help the case if no felony was committed. Reasonable beliefs as to the content of the law serve as no defense
to the peace officer. Reasonable beliefs as to facts are the least the law
expects in some situations; in others, even more is required. In any
event, the inquiry never becomes entirely subjective, focusing on the
honest beliefs of the defendant or his reasonable interpretation of the
law.
19. 56 Mich. at 466-67, 23 N.W. at 169.
20. Id. at 464, 23 N.W. at 168.
21. 100 Me. 322, 61 A. 774 (1905).
22. 35 Wis. 103 (1874), discussed in text accompanying note 11
supra. The Maine case is Warren v. Kellery, 80 Me. 512, 15 A. 49 (1888),
where plaintiff sued a county sheriff for trespass in seizing a schooner
of which plaintiff was a mortgagee. The seizure had been made to satisfy a statutory lien for labor and materials used in the schooner's repair, but plaintiff claimed that the portion of the statute which provided
for enforcement of the lien was unconstitutional. Agreeing that the statute was indeed unconstitutional, the Warren court upheld a verdict
against the sheriff.
The Rush court viewed Warren as a case in which the absence of
jurisdiction to enforce the lien was apparent from the face of the process, since only federal courts had jurisdiction over such subject matter.
100 Me. at 327-28, 61 A. at 777. Of course, this lack of jurisdiction is
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officer had a privilege to arrest under a warrant fair and full on
its face. Just as the ultimate innocence of a felon does not undo
the probable cause reasonably entertained by the officers at the
time of the arrest without warrant, 23 so also in this case the
ultimate innocence of the plaintiff did not undo the judicial
determination of probable cause evidenced by the warrant. This
judicial determination provided the officer with a presumptive
justification for his actions; but nowhere is there an intimation
that, had the officer known the fact of the ordinance's nonpublication, he could have been relieved of the consequences of his
failure to appreciate the legal significance of that fact.24

In-

deed, the court's opinion emphasizes that the officer's ignorance
25
was one of fact. Nowhere is an ignorance of the law excused.
MONROE V. PAPE:
UNDER

OBJECTIVE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT

42 U.S.C. § 1983

In recent times, individuals aggrieved by most types of police
misconduct have begun to bring suit in federal court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983,20 alleging deprivations of their constitutional
rights. Only with the recent case of Monroe v.Pape,27 however,
apparent only in the sense that one who knows the law can see that
process (1) was issued from a state court and (2) directs in rem seizure
of a vessel, and can conclude that this encroaches upon the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts. A layman would not even be able to
discern that the process was in rem; yet liability will attach, notwithstanding his ignorance of the law.
23. See note 18 supra.
24. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 121, comment i (1965),
quoted in note 18 supra.
25. 100 Me. at 330-31, 61 A. at 778. The ignorance in Campbell,
see text accompanying notes 11-16 supra, was not really one of fact. The
sheriff did not know of the Supreme Court decisions which led the Wisconsin court to conclude that its statute was unconstitutional. That the
Supreme Court had made these decisions may be a "fact" (although the
decisions embody "law"); but the fact is one entirely irrelevant to the
Wisconsin statute's constitutionality. Without these decisions, the Wisconsin court could still have declared its statute unconstitutional, denying it as a basis for privilege. Ignorance of this "fact" could hardly affect
defendant's ability to claim privilege. Nonpublication, however, was essential in Rush to a declaration of invalidity.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
27.

365 U.S. 167 (1961).

For commentary on the case, see Shapo,

ConstitutionalTort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw.
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did it become evident that, insofar as the Constitution embodies
common-law notions of liberty,28 such suits differ little from
common-law actions for trespass except for the element of state
action. Pre-Monroe courts had been reluctant to allow every
false arrest or illegal search and seizure to rise to the level of a
section 1983 violation, thereby allowing access to the federal
courts. 29

Plaintiffs in a section 1983 case had generally been

required to establish discrimination in addition to illegal conduct. This added element of bad faith was thought necessary
to make a false arrest or illegal search a violation of section
1983. 30
Monroe, however, appears to lay this issue to rest. In the
course of a long opinion dealing with the meaning of the phrase
"under color of" state law, the Court summarily stated that
specific intent to deprive a person of a constitutional right is not
essential to recovery under section 1983. Rather, that section
"should be read against the background of tort liability that
makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his
3
actions." '
Lower courts were quick to take up this statement and its
implication that ulterior motive or bad faith is no longer
necessary to turn a good trespass action into a good section 1983
action. Thus, conduct illegal without regard to the actor's subjective intent is actionable in the federal courts under section
1983 just as it would be in the state courts under the various
32
labels of trespass.
U.L. REV. 277 (1965); Note, ConstitutionalLaw: "Under Color of Law"
and the Civil Rights Act, 1961 fDurm L. J. 452; The Supreme Court, 1960
Term, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 211 (1961); 15 VANiD. L. RPv. 267 (1961).
28. See Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 278-79 (3d Cir. 1972); Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J.
5 (1974). But see Polite v. DieM, 507 F.2d 119, 124 (3d Cir. 1974)
(Kalodner, J., dissenting).
29. The appropriate jurisdictional statute for a suit brought in federal court under section 1983 is 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) (1970).
30. See, e.g., Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959); Agnew
v. City of Compton, 239 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1956).
31. 365 U.S. at 187. The Court distinguished civil actions under section 1983 from criminal actions under similar penal statutes which require proof of specific intent to deprive another of his constitutional
rights. For example, in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), the
court reversed a conviction under the forerunner of 18 U.S.C. § 242
(1970), because the trial court did not adequately instruct the jury that
the defendants must have had a specific intent to deprive their victim
of a constitutional right.
32. See, e.g., Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965); Stringer
v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963); Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24
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In Lucero v. Donavan,3 3 the defendant officers happened
upon plaintiff's brother, who was wandering on the public way,
perhaps under the influence of narcotics. The officers eventually
took him to plaintiff's house, which the brother allegedly gave
them consent to search, although it was far from clear that he had
ever been more than a welcome occasional visitor there. Only
after they had entered and started a search of her home did the
plaintiff discover their presence. She ordered them to leave, but
they continued to search until they found a bottle of pills in a
cabinet. Plaintiff was then arrested for possession of narcotics.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a directed verdict for the defendants. Although at the time state law on
the issue of third-party consent to a search seemed to support the
officers' activity, 34 the court nevertheless made an objective inquiry into the constitutionality of those actions. Since plaintiff
could revoke the consent under federal law, the officers would
be liable for their failure to desist once she had ordered them to
do so. Likewise, if the brother had no authority to consent in the
first place, not even a concept like apparent authority would save
the officers from liability. Federal constitutional law did not
allow such an extension of the privilege to search under a thirdparty's consent, even though state law may have sanctioned the
practice.35 Whether they knew it or not, the officers, in the
court's view, had been acting illegally. That the officers may
have thought they were acting properly was unimportant. Regardless of their subjective intent, they had conducted an illegal
search as judged by federal constitutional standards, which the
court applied just as rigorously in a section 1983 action as on a
motion to suppress in a criminal case.
A decision from the Fifth Circuit further illustrates the
determination of the federal courts after Monroe to employ an
objective standard even in close, difficult cases where the police

(9th Cir. 1962). But see Gabbard v. Rose, 359 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1966)
(relying on Agnew v. City of Compton, 239 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1956),
a case which was overruled by Cohen).
Of course, violations of state tort law are not actionable under section 1983 to the extent that they lack constitutional overtones. See cases
cited in note 28 supra.
33. 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965).
34. See People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955).
35. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964). Long before
Stoner and Gorg, the Court had constitutionally invalidated third-party
consent searches effected by federal agents. See United States v. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48 (1951); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
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officer bears no malice toward the citizen. In Nesmith v. Alford,36
the plaintiffs, a sociology professor and his students from an
Illinois school, had traveled to Alabama. There, as part of their
field trip to study racial problems, they had lunch in a public
restaurant with a number of the community's black members. A
87
large group, some curious and some arguably bent on violence,
gathered outside the restaurant. Anxious lest a riot break out
(for there had been a good deal of racial violence in the city
during the past month), the local police arrested the plaintiffs for
disorderly conduct. Although an ordinance requiring segregation
in restaurants had recently been repealed, the police determined
that an arrest would avert a breach of the peace.
Considering the plaintiffs' appeal in the resulting section
1983 action, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, over
dissent, reversed a jury verdict for the arresting officers. Despite
its willingness to accept the fact that the officers had acted in
8 the court declared that as a matter of law
complete good faith,3
they had had no probable cause to deprive the plaintiffs of their
freedom to engage in lawful conduct considered so obnoxious
by others that the latter might inflict violence on the former. The
court thus imposed liabliity for arrest in a situation that has
produced such fine lines of constitutional analysis3 9 that, in any

given case, a policeman could almost always claim a reasonable
belief in the correctness of his course of action. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit required arrest upon traditional
probable cause and, even in a close case, would hold the police
officer accountable for his error in judgment notwithstanding his
good faith. Laudable purposes did not substitute for the required
objective knowledge that such conduct could be considered a
crime under neither state law nor federal constitutional standards.
PIEsoN V. RAY: A SouRcE OF CoNFusIoN
A few years after Monroe, the Supreme Court introduced
considerable confusion into the law with its decision in Piersonv.
Ray,40 which has been taken by some courts to allow considera36. 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963).
37. Id. at 120.
38. Id. at 120-21.
39. Compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), with Feiner
v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
40. 386 U.S. 547 (1967); accord, Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183
(5th Cir. 1971).
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tion only of the defendant officer's subjective state of mind.41 In
that case petitioners were clergymen who had attempted to integrate facilities in a bus terminal. They were arrested for and
convicted of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor; but one of their
group sought a trial de novo under state procedure and won a
directed verdict of acquittal. Charges against the others, awaiting
de novo trials, were dropped. They then initiated section 1983
actions against the police officers who had arrested them and the
judge who had originally convicted them. After losing a jury
verdict, they appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir42
cuit.
While their appeal was pending, the statute under which
plaintiffs had been arrested was declared unconstitutional by the
United States Supreme Court in Thomas v. Mississipp, 4 3 a case
involving similar facts. The holding of the Thomas opinion,
which was a memorandum reversal of the Mississippi Supreme
Court, leaves a good deal to the imagination. 4 4 Nonetheless, after
reading the state court's lengthy narration of facts and opinion,45
one may reasonably infer that the United States Supreme Court
took issue with the Mississippi statute4 6 to the extent that it made
a failure to leave an interstate bus terminal disorderly conduct
when the arrestee had been conducting himself peaceably and the
only threatened breach of the peace was by others against him.
Only a portended breach of the peace by the arrestee himself
could constitutionally lead to his arrest and conviction for disorderly conduct.

On hearing the Pierson appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held the judge immune from suit.47 On the pendent
state law claim against the officers, that court held that Mississippi law, although perhaps a minority position, would protect
officers who make arrests for violations of a subsequently invalidated statute.48 Reliance on the invalid statute would not insulate them from a section 1983 claim, however.
41. See text accompanying notes 57, 67-108 infra.
42. 352 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965).
43. 380 U.S. 524 (1965).
44. The Court cited two cases in support of its reversal: Boynton
v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) (invalidating a state criminal trespass
to property conviction as repugnant to the Interstate Commerce Act)
and Abernathy v. Alabama, 42 Ala. App. 149, 155 So. 2d 586 (1962), T'ev'd
per curium, 380 U.S. 447 (1965).
45. 252 Miss. 527, 160 So. 2d 657 (1964).
46. For the text of the statute in question, see 252 Miss, at 528,
160 So. 2d at 658.
47. The Supreme Court upheld this ruling. 386 U.S. at 553-55.
48. Golden v. Thompson, 194 Miss. 241, 11 So. 2d 906 (1943), which
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Reviewing the case on certiorari, the Supreme Court took
issue with the proposition of the court of appeals that "[t]he
policemen would be liable in a suit under § 1983 for an unconstitutional arrest even if they acted in good faith and with probable
cause in making an arrest under a state statute not yet held
invalid." 49 The Court reiterated its desire that section 1983 actions be considered against the background of common-law tort
liability5" and, challenging the appellate court's reading of the
common law, decided that a good faith reliance on the constitutionality of a later invalidated statute was consistent with the
common-law privilege to arrest on probable cause.5 1 Since that
common-law privilege itself depends not on actual guilt, but on
the appearance of guilt, the subsequent ruling that the statute
was invalid does not destroy the appearance of guilt and leaves
the privilege unimpaired. The limited authorities on this narrow
point seem to uphold the Court's assessment, 2 although the
the court cited for this proposition, 352 F.2d at 219, had only the slightest
pertinence to the case at hand. In Golden, a principal was allowed to
rely on an unconstitutional statute in expelling the plaintiffs from school.
There was no issue of battery, false arrest, or false imprisonment.
Plaintiffs were seeking compensation for loss of their right to pursue an
education.
49. 386 U.S. at 550.
50. Id. at 556, citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
51. 386 U.S. at 555. Without so acknowledging, the Court seemed
to view the privilege to arrest for a misdemeanor as identical with the
privilege to arrest for a felony. The common-law privilege to arrest
without warrant for misdemeanors has varied considerably from time to
time. At the time of the Court's opinion, however, it seems that the privilege required actual commission of a breach of the peace in the officer's
presence. See RESTATEMTENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 119(c), 121(a)
(1965). That standard, unlike the probable cause standard employed in
the arrest of suspected felons, would permit the arrestee's ultimate innocence to strip the officer of his privilege. Id. § 119, comment o (section
121 (c)does not seem applicable to the facts in Pierson). To the extent
that the Court sees an identity of the privilege to arrest for felony with
the privilege to arrest for misdemeanor, Pierson makes new law. But
see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), fully considered in Bohlen & Shulman, Arrest With and Without Warrant, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 485
(1927). For a more explicit and considered treatment of this matter,
see Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1974).
52. See Miller v. Stinnett, 257 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1958) (diversity
case); Manson v. Wabash R.R., 338 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. 1960); Bricker v.
Sims, 195 Tenn. 361, 259 S.W.2d 661 (1953); Cartwright v. Canode, 106
Tex. 502, 171 S.W. 696 (1914). But see State v. Hunter, 106 N.C. 796,
11 S.E. 366 (1890) (privilege conditioned on arrestee's actual guilt). Liability was imposed in Sumner v. Beeler, 50 Ind. 341 (1875). Although
it is not at all clear from the statement of the facts by the court in Sumner, one Indiana court regards the case as one where arrest followed the
declaration of invalidity. Thus, where there has been no declaration of
invalidity, the statute could presumably be relied upon by police offi-

1975]

GOOD FAITH DEFENSE

1003

proposition does seem inconsistent with the general insistence of
the common law that ignorance of the law can serve as no excuse.
Perhaps the Court should have rooted out this inconsistency.
The fact that it did not do so, but rather ratified the dissonance,
gives no indication that it would favor a general liberalization of
the privilege rules. Narrowly read, Pierson excuses only acts
which fall within the common-law privilege to arrest on a good
faith and reasonable misinterpretationof a statute, the content of
which was known to the officers at the time of their act, and
which was later invalidated. For example, the officers in Pierson
were required to know the content of the statute itself;
mistakes of law on this level are still to be penalized. 53 If the
Mississippi statute in actual fact had made a refusal to disperse
disorderly conduct only where the person asked to leave was
himself unruly, the officers would have had no probable cause to
cials. Saloom v. Holder, 304 N.E.2d 217 (Ind. App. 1973).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 121, comment i, in a caveat and
accompanying comment reserves opinion on the issue of whether a stat-

ute's unconstitutionality detracts from an objective determination that
probable cause to arrest for its violation existed. The Restatement, however, generally does hold the policeman liable for mistakes of law in
warrantless arrests. Thus, in the view of the restaters, one cannot reasonably suspect that an "act or omission" constituting an offense has
been committed unless he knows the elements of the offense. A mistake
about the elements of an offense or about an offense's inclusion of certain
acts might improperly affect the officer's reasonable beliefs, and thus
should not be available as a defense. Notwithstanding the availability
of a good defense found in constitutional law, however, an officer could
suspect that an act or omission proscribed by legislative enactment has
taken place. The privilege for arrests without warrant found in section
121 does not require that the offense actually take place. So, even
though the Constitution makes the statute a nullity and no crime took
place, the officer still may rely on his reasonable belief that certain proscribed acts took place.
53. That this is a correct interpretation of Pierson is supported by
the Court's most recent pronouncement on immunities under section
1983. In Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), the Court held that
a school board official enjoyed immunity from suit under section 1983
for actions taken in good faith fulfillment of his responsibilities and
within the bounds of reason. See text accompanying notes 114-26 infra.
The Court added, however, that
an act violating a student's constitutional rights can be no more
justified by ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable law
...
than by the presence of actual malice.... [A] school board
member ... must be held to a standard of conduct based not
only on permissible intentions, but also on knowledge of the
basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his charges.
420 U.S. at 321-22. Although the Wood case dealt with school board
immunities, which are not at all analogous at common law to the privileges afforded police officers, see notes 126-28 infra and accompanying
text, it nevertheless is likely that Pierson would be similarly limited.
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arrest, even if they had reasonably and in good faith believed that
the statute came into play when someone other than the arrestee
was creating the breach of the peace.5 4 Moreover, even if the
officers did reasonably and in good faith misinterpret a statute
the content of which was known to them, their immunity might
still be lost. The Court in Pierson left the truthfulness of the
officers' contention that the white crowd at the bus station was
threatening a breach of the peace open for jury resolution, despite the apparent holding in Thomas that such a situation would
not support a charge of disorderly conduct against the object of
the crowd's wrath. Thus, if the jury were to find that the crowd
had not actually been unruly, there would be no privilege to
arrest for violation of the statute even accepting the officers'
interpretation of it.55 Finally, it should be noted that the officers'
ignorance in Pierson was of a specialized sort: they arrested in
reliance on a statute not yet declared invalid. Had there been no
statute at all on which to rely or had the statute been invalidated
before the arrests, the officers would have been liable. The
Court's opinion goes on to restrict that privilege even further by
requiring that their reliance be reasonable. This suggests that,
even though the statute had not yet been declared invalid at the
time of arrest, the officers could nonetheless be held liable in
certain cases if it is found that they should have anticipated this
constitutional development. 56
Despite the fact that Pierson appears to give only a narrowly
54. See Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963);

MENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs § 121, comment i (1965).

RESTATE-

55. See 386 U.S. at 557.
56. See Miller v. Stinnett, 257 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1958); Flemming
v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 239 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1956). But
see Boca Raton v. Coughlin, 299 So. 2d 105 (Fla. App. 1974). It is difficult to understand what relationship the Court's further requirement of
"good faith" has with a requirement that the reliance be reasonable. The
common law does not inquire into the actor's ulterior motives so long
as he has, by objective standards, a valid privilege. See Ames v. Strain,
301 P.2d 641 (Okla. 1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 127, comment a, at 226 (1965). A handful of recent cases indicates that the actions of law enforcement officials may lead to liability if done in bad
faith-their subjective intent drains the validity from normally legal
acts. These cases, however, give no indication that subjective intent is
the only aspect of a defendant's actions open to scrutiny by a court. See
Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585 (D. Minn. 1973); cf. Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. La. 1970), affd, 467 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1972);
Duncan v. Perez, 321 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1970), affd, 445 F.2d 557
(5th Cir. 1971). See generally MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373 (9th
Cir. 1970) (habeas corpus granted where petitioner was charged and convicted on an offense which the prosecutor had been willing to drop until
petitioner refused to forego a false arrest suit against police officers).
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circumscribed immunity consistent with the common law, the
Court made statements in the course of that opinion which have
led the lower courts to believe that inquiry into the defendant's
objective intent has been abandoned:
We agree that a police officer is not charged with predicting
the future course of constitutional law ... if the jury found
that the officers reasonably believed in good faith that the
arrest was constitutional, then a verdict for the officers would
follow even though the arrest was in fact unconstitutional. 57
These statements, implying that the jury should always examine
only the officer's reasonable beliefs as to the legality of his
actions, and not his reasonable beliefs as to the facts concerning
an arrest, could considerably weaken the Court's adoption of a
common-law standard of immunity in Monroe-a standard which
Pierson acknowledged. Obviously, if the court inquires only into
the reasonableness of a man's belief that he acted lawfully, the
inquiry becomes quite subjective. Every officer, if credible to the
trier of fact, becomes his own measure of the law, and honestly
professed ignorance of the law becomes a potent defense. Although the plaintiff need not prove malevolence or discrimination, if this interpretation of Pierson is accepted, he must resist
convincing claims that the officer did not know he was violating
the law and the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
At first the lower courts were slow to read Pierson as
dispensing with an inquiry into the officer's objective intent in
all cases. In Joseph v. Rowlen, 8 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed a directed verdict for a police officer
who arrested pursuant to a command from his sergeant. In
response to an argument that Pierson gave the officer a defense
of "good faith," the court said that objective probable cause was
also required. Pierson in no way detracted from Monroe; it did
not reinstitute any requirement of malevolence, discriminatory
purpose, or flagrant illegality. 59
57. 386 U.S. at 557.
58. 402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968), noted in Note, Civil Liability of
Police for False Arrest, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 229 (1969). Accord, Duncan
v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972); Ker
v. Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir. 1970). But see Banish v. Locks, 414
F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1969).
59. Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit overruled
its pre-Monroe decisions, e.g., Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959).
On retrial in Joseph, the jury found for the plaintiff but awarded
him no damages, a verdict upheld on appeal. 425 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir.
1970). This is but one indication of how unlikely the plaintiff's chances
of success are in police misconduct suits.
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Whirl v. KernO° illustrates more clearly the initial conviction
of the lower courts that Monroe had created a federal law of
intentional 61 police torts and that Pierson did not authorize an
inquiry into an official's subjective good faith alone. In Whirl, the
plaintiff had been arrested and committed to jail in lieu of bail.
Indictments against him were later dismissed; but word of their
dismissal did not filter down to his keeper, the county sheriff,
until some nine months after the fact. Plaintiff sued under both
section 1983 and the common law for this unwanted extension of
his jailer's hospitality. The sheriff contended that he was unaware of the facts and bore no malice toward the prisoner. Hence,
he could not be held for a violation of section 1983, since, under
Pierson,he was in "good faith" ignorance of his charge's right to
freedom. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected this
argument by interpreting Pierson to merely permit a privilege of
good faith and probable cause to a charge of false arrest, such as
the common law had traditionally allowed. 62 Under this view,
Pierson did not throw a blanket of "good faith" over all police
conduct,6 3 and particularly not over the maintenance of a jail. In
actions for false imprisonment, the common law allowed no defense such as that proffered by the sheriff. Both mistakes of fact
and mistakes of law would lead to liability.6 Finding no commonlaw privilege-and for good reason 6 5-the court thought inapposite the "good faith" language in Pierson dealing with the exercise
of a privilege to arrest. Since upon the dismissal of the indictments there was not even a privilege to detain, the good or bad
intent of the jailer became irrelevant. As in Entick, absence of
privilege made for liability.6 6
60. 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969).
61. At this stage one cannot say whether Monroe gives relief for
mere negligence. Compare Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir.
1970), with Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418
(1973).
62. 407 F.2d at 790-91. Whether the common law looked into the
actor's motives, except as they related to probable cause, is debatable.
See note 56 supra.
63. See Burnett v. Dickerson, 485 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1973); Gaines
v. McGraw, 445 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1971); Sexton v. Gibbs, 327 F. Supp.
134 (N.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1971).
64. 407 F.2d at 791, emphasizing that the privilege to arrest is not
always the same as the privilege to confine; accord, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 11, at 46 n.86 (4th ed. 1971). But see Johannsen v. Steuvart, 260 Iowa 1140, 152 N.W.2d 202 (1967).
65. "A jailer, unlike a policeman, acts at his leisure." 407 F.2d at
792.
66. See text accompanying note 7 supra. A number of post-Pierson
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit eventually
seized upon the erroneous implications of the above quoted

language in Pierson.67 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,6s agents of the Federal Bur-

eau of Narcotics had entered petitioner's apartment without a
warrant and arrested him. After the agents had searched him as
well as the entire apartment, they took him to headquarters,
booked him, and placed him in confinement. Sometime later a
United States commissioner dismissed the complaint lodged
against him. Smarting from the episode, Bivens filed a suit in
federal district court and demanded damages for a violation of
his fourth amendment rights. After failure in the district court 69
and in the court of appeals, 70 he finally persuaded the Supreme
Court that he had a federal cause of action for the claimed indignities inflicted upon him.71 Having acknowledged plaintiff's federal cause of action, the Court left open for consideration
on remand whether the officers should receive the benefit of immunity by virtue of their official position.7 2
On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
itself remanded to the district court in a ruling that the agents
had no immunity which would set up an absolute bar to suit.73
cases from other circuits support the view that that case in no way dispensed with the objective inquiry into the legality of the officer's acts
envisioned by Monroe. See Barnes v. Dorsey, 480 F.2d 1057 (8th Cir.
1973); Anderson v. Reynolds, 476 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1973); Howell v.
Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972); Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub noam. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Madison v. Manter, 441 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1971);
Giordano v. Lee, 434 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971); Jenkins v. Averett, 424
F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970); Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968). But see Valdez v. Black, 446 F.2d 1071
(10th Cir. 1971) (arrests by National Guard); Notaras v. Ramon, 383 F.2d
403 (9th Cir. 1967); Golden v. Smith, 324 F. Supp. 727 (D. Ore. 1971).
67. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
68. 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
69. 276 F. Supp. 12 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
70. 409 F.2d718 (2d Cir. 1969).
71. 403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971). The Court had left this precise
question open in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), when it ruled that
federal courts had jurisdiction to hear a complaint alleging a violation
of the fourth amendment although the complaint might or might not
state a cause of action.
72. 403 U.S. at 397-98.
73. 456 F.2d 1339, 1342-47 (2d Cir. 1972). The court reasoned that
since state and local police officers who are sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970) do not have immunity, neither should federal police officers who
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The court of appeals then, however, deftly proceeded to erect a
barrier to the plaintiff's claim as effective as the one it had just
previously demolished. After a brief encomium on the value of
the police role in society,T4 the court announced that the defendant officers might avail themselves of the common-law defense
of probable cause and good faith.7 5 After all, the court opined,
the law of individual liberties is much too complicated to hold the
officer liable for his mistaken actions which result in depriva76
tions of those liberties.
This initial reference to the "common-law" defense is somewhat abbreviated and masks the fact that the privilege cited
77
refers to warrantless on-the-street arrests of suspected felons.
The common-law privilege to make an unconsented entry into a
dwelling, on the other hand, is rather narrow: the officer must
have a warrant7 8 or be in "hot pursuit" of an offender.7 9 There is
no general doctrine authorizing warrantless, yet reasonable, entries of dwellings.80 As Whirl v. Kernsl. pointed out so cogently,
the common law gave police officers no general privilege to act
reasonably, although unlawfully.8 2 Instead, as held in Entick,
are sued in tort under federal common law for violations of fourth
amendment rights. The two causes of action parallel each other to such
an extent that it would be anamolous to grant a defense not allowed in
section 1983 actions.
74. rW] e must not be unmindful of the fact that these FBI and
Narcotics Agents, whose lives are in constant danger... perform
functions indispensable to the preservation of our American way
of life. They must not be left defenseless against the demands
of every person who manages to escape from the toils of the
criminal law.
456 F.2d at 1347.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 1348.
77. See note 18 supra; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 121(b)
(1965). This long-standing common-law rule is codified in 26 U.S.C. §
7607(2) (1970), which the court inappropriately cited. 456 F.2d at 1347.
78. See Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 120 Mass. 190 (1876).
79. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Maleverer v.
Spinke, 1 Dyer 35b, 36b, 73 Eng. Rep. 79, 81 (K.B. 1538).
80. See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958); Fisher v. Volz,
496 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (en banc); Lankford v. Gelstan, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966);
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 204-06 (1965). But see Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (where the Court regarded the issue
as open); United States v. Curran, 489 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1974). At least
one member of the Court does not think that the issue is an open one.
See Mr. Justice Stewart's remarks, reprinted in Y. KaumSAR, W. LA FAvE
& J. ISRAEL, MODERIN CRVIMINAL PROCEDURE 311-12 n.a (4th ed. 1974).

81.
82,

407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 789-93,
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privileges are narrow rules of specific content.83 Thus, even if
Pierson could be interpreted to establish a completely subjective
test where warranted by the common law-and it is the position
of this Article that the case should not be so interpreted 84 -that
result would not support Bivens, since the appellate court there
went far beyond the common law which both Pierson and Monroe recognize as the appropriate guide for police privilege. Had
the court of appeals desired to allow a warrantless, nonemergency search of a dwelling, it should have done so by laying down an
objective rule. As Pierson demonstrated, even though privileges
are objective rules, the courts may change their content.8 5
Even more egregious than the imprecision to be found in the
court's reference to a "common-law privilege" is the distortion
practiced next by the court when it maintains that the common
law's defense "has been consistently read as meaning good faith
and 'reasonable belief' in the validity of the arrest or search." 86
With only perfunctory, if not inaccurate, reliance on secondary
source material,8 7 the court transformed a limited privilege to
arrest when an officer reasonably suspects the arrestee to have
committed a crime into blanket approval for all police activities
where the officer reasonably and honestly regards himself in
compliance with the law. Thus, Pierson'sloose suggestion that an
officer need not predict "the future course of constitutional
law,"8 8 when taken out of context, prompted a drastic shift in the
emphasis of a court's inquiry. Rather than enforcing compliance
with some objective standard-even a new one, more sensitive to
the needs of the police-the court sanctioned honest but reasonable ignorance of all the rules.8 9 The narrow privilege recognized in Piersonwill not support such a broad expansion.
As is evident from a consideration of the material presented
earlier,0 0 the common law-contrary to the assertion of the
83. See text accompanying notes 5-9 supra.
84. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
85. See note 51 supra.
86. 456 F.2d at 1347.
87. Although the court cited Pierson for its conclusion, it made no
analysis of the decision to support its reliance. Nor does a reading of
26 U.S.C. § 7607 (1970) support the court's conclusion-it merely codifies
the common law's objective standard in giving federal narcotics agents
a privilege to arrest without warrant.
88. 386 U.S. at 557.
89. Bivens was not a section 1983 action. Later decisions, however,
have regarded its ruling in a suit against federal officers as equally appropriate in suits against state officers under section 1983. See Brubaker
v. King, 505 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1974). Cf. note 73 supra.
90. See text accompanying notes 4-25 supra.
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit-did not allow an officer
the luxury of presenting his evaluation of his actions as a defense
to a trespass case. Nor do the two citations to secondary sources
presented by the court bear out its assertion; in fact, close
attention to those sources reveals serious distortion in their use.
The Harper and James treatise, to which the court made reference, merely states the traditional rule acknowledged in Pierson
that in false arrest cases the ultimate innocence of the suspect
does not undo or detract from the elements of probable cause: a
reasonable belief that a felony has been committed and that the
arrestee has committed the suspected felony. 9 ' Nowhere, in fairness to these eminent authors, can one discover a statement that
an officer may judge for himself whether his belief as to the
lawfulness of his actions is reasonable.9 2 It is thus a distortion of
the passage referred to by the court to say that the authors
declare that the officer need only have had" 'reasonable belief' in
the validity of the arrest or search." 93 Likewise, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts allows an officer to harbor reasonable, though
mistaken, views as to the facts surrounding a warrantless on-thestreet arrest, but not as to the legal principles which should
94
govern his conduct in light of those facts.
The new doctrine would, of course, take its toll on the
privilege doctrines that place strict liability on the officer. As
noted earlier, if a third party does not have actual authority to
consent to a search, the search is invalid and actionable.9" Under
a Bivens standard, however, the third party's apparent authority
would justify an officer's reasonable belief that he was acting
91. 1 HARPER & JmEs, supra note 4, § 3.18, at 277-78. This is a
much broader privilege than that accorded the private citizen: he must
show that a felony has in fact been committed. Id. See also discussion
in note 18 supra.
92. The book's discussion of Hogg v. Ward, 157 Eng. Rep. 533 (Ex.
1858), leaves exactly the contrary impression. 1 HARPER & JAMEs, supra
note 4, § 3.18, at 278. The Supreme Court in Pierson also cited the
Harper & James treatise, but accurately for the general proposition that
the arrestee's later-proved innocence does not undo the police officer's
probable cause to arrest. 386 U.S. at 555.
93. 456 F.2d at 1347.
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 121, comment i (1965).
Cf. Rush v. Buckley, 100 Me. 322, 61 A. 774 (1905), discussed in text
accompanying notes 21-25 supra. In that case, a warrant for a misdemeanor arrest insulated the officer from suit even though it later developed that the ordinance for which plaintiff was arrested was invalid by
reason of nonpublication. The existence of the warrant, which gave no
indication of the facts that the arrestee might later use to urge his innocence, furnished a justification.
95. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra,
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legally in proceeding under that person's consent. The officer's
appreciation of the facts might thus possibly immunize him
where the applicable rule of law says that such an appraisal is
irrelevant.
This new theory of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
made a crucial difference in the Eighth Circuit case of Mattis V.
906
Schnarr.
There, the defendant officer, losing his foot race with
a suspected felon who had been fleeing unarmed from a nonviolent felony, shot and killed the suspect. The Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit thought that Missouri statutes allowing
such a use of deadly force provided a defense as a matter of law
to an action by a representative of the decedent, since the statutes had never been declared unconstitutional. In the opinion of
that court, the officer should be entitled to rely on state statutes
never declared unconstitutional. 97 This result is not consistent
with the common law, as Pierson and Monroe appear to require; 98 by contrast, a case following the common-law rule illustrates with some irony the greater rigor and exactness of that
approach. In Smith v. Costello,99 the defendant conservation
officer shot plaintiff's dog, relying on a state statute declaring
any dog running at large in territory inhabited by deer to be a
nuisance and giving game wardens summary authority to kill the
animal. The Idaho Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional and held the officer liable for property damage, stating
that "[a]n unconstitutional act is not law and . . . confers no
rights and affords no protection."'10 0 Had this course been followed in Mathis, the officer there would have been held liable for
his action if the statute were indeed found to be unconstitutional.
A recent case from the Ninth Circuit illustrates how drastic a
change this new doctrine can work on the plaintiff's chances of
recovery where the case law surrounding a privilege is in a state
of tension. In Williams v. Gould,10 1 a police officer, lacking a
warrant, burst into the plaintiff's apartment because he believed
a felon to be inside. Reversing a directed verdict for the plaintiff
in an action brought under section 1983, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit commented that the officer should have been
96. 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974).
97. Accord, Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1975); Kotmair v. Gray, 505 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1974); Laverne v. Corning, 376 F.
Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
98. See text accompanying notes 26-31, 50-51 supra.
99. 77 Idaho 205, 290 P.2d 742 (1955).
100. Id. at 209, 290 P.2d at 744.
101. 486 F,2d 547 (9th Cir. 1973).
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allowed to show not only a reasonable belief that a felon was
lurking in the apartment, but also a reasonable belief that the
law would sanction his actions under those reasonably believed
facts, even if the officer's judgment as to the law should in fact be
erroneous. In fact, scrutiny of the relevant Restatement provisions indicates no such privilege at common law.10 2 Moreover, if
an officer's legal conclusions as to the propriety of his acts serve
as a defense, even a proviso that his judgment must be reasonable
leaves remediless the citizen whose constitutional right to privacy has been violated. If, as the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit maintained, the legal question of whether a warrant is
required in such a situation was an open one, 103 a jury would be
hard-pressed to say that the nonlawyer officer was unreasonable
in reaching the conclusion that he did. The validity of a warrantless search under circumstances such as those found in the
Williams case is an open question only in the sense that some
lower courts have departed from the traditional understanding
of the fourth amendment on this point. 0 4 Those decisions, however, must certainly lend plausibility to a claim that the officer
thought his actions to be justified. Thus, under the Williams
court's view of this matter, a conflict among the circuits would
permit an officer to raise an incorrect reading of the law as a
defense even where no Ninth Circuit decisions supported the
defendant's belief and possibly even where its decisions were
contrary to his belief.
102. As a matter of tort law, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 206 (1965) would consider such an entry to be unprivileged. If the
court disagreed with this approach in its view of constitutional law, it
should have said so. Instead, the officer's perception of the law made
the resolution of the matter immaterial.
The common-law rules in this area are so precise that, had the officer possessed an arrest warrant, he would have been privileged to enter
the dwelling if he reasonably believed the person named in the warrant
to be present inside. Rodriquez v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973) (applying the Restatement rule). Schirott &
Kolar, False Arrest: Good Faith a Defense to Section 1983 Actions, 1974
INs. L.J. 213, 216, reads Rodriquez as being in accord with Williams for
the proposition that good faith can cure an illegal entry. Although Rodriquez has some language approving of Bivens, 473 F.2d at 605, its holding results from an application of objective standards and not from the
court's evaluation of the defendant's understanding of those standards.
At least one state has, by statute, abolished the intricacies of this
area. See LA.CODE Cinw. PRO., art. 224 (1966). Under the approach outlined in the text accompanying notes 96-97 supra, police officers may
rely for a time on this statute, even though it may conflict with the common-law doctrine embodied in the fourth amendment.
103. 486 F.2d at 548.

104. See text accompanying notes 78-80 supra.
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In Mattis v. Schnarr,10 5 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit remanded the case for consideration of the constitutionality of the statutes in question, indicating that a declaration of
invalidity would deprive officers in future cases of a defense
based on reliance upon these statutes.10 6 Although one might
fault the court in Mattis for going beyond Pierson v. Ray by
allowing reliance on any not yet invalidated statute in any situation, the court was faithful to the Pierson approach in so limiting
the permissible reliance. Under the approach taken by the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Williams, however, a declaration of the statute's invalidity would still leave much discretion
to a police official: absent a Supreme Court decision directly on
point, the statute itself as well as any case law in conflict with
the declaration would make reasonable a police officer's belief
10 7
that he might use deadly force on a felon.
This new doctrine could have a major impact in cases where
the defendant would not dispute the general content of the
applicable rule of law, but rather thought incorrectly that the
facts were sufficient to bring his conduct within that rule. The
exclusionary device in criminal cases has been in operation long
enough to generate numerous precedents holding that certain
facts do or do not establish as a matter of law the conformity of
the officer's questioned conduct with an applicable rule of law.
These precedents establish guidelines for the judge in deciding
whether to direct a verdict in civil cases against the officers
where a similar privilege is claimed. 0 8 General acceptance of a
defense that one reasonably thought his actions to be privileged
would render such precedents inapplicable since the focus would
shift from the character of his conduct as a matter of law to the
reasonableness of his belief, a jury question. Thus, a defendant
could get to the jury in a case where, were it a criminal case, the
judge would be obliged to suppress because of applicable precedent.
By way of example, an officer may search a dwelling incident
to a lawful arrest of its occupant in order to prevent the arrestee's escape, an assault on the officer, or destruction of evi105. 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974).
106. Id. at 596.
107. See Boca Raton v. Coughlin, 299 So. 2d 105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974). See generally United States v. Peltier, 95 S. Ct. 2313, 2321 (1975)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. See Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965); Anderson
v. Haas, 341 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1965); Sexton v. Gibbs, 327 F. Supp. 134
(N.D, Tex. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1971),
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dence.' 0 9 In United States v. Baca,"0 the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit held a search of a dwelling which had been
conducted after the arrestee had been handcuffed with his hands
behind his back illegal as a matter of law. The court therefore
suppressed evidence obtained in that search in the prosecution of
a companion who had also occupied the house. One might reasonably suspect that this precedent would guide future Tenth Circuit judges in ruling on both motions to suppress and motions to
direct verdicts in civil cases, where the search in question was
conducted after the arrestee had been handcuffed. If the arresting officer were to testify that he felt a need to search even after
this critical point in time, the matter would appear to require the
jury to pass on his defense, notwithstanding the rule already
developed in the case law. Baca, after all, merely declared such
conduct illegal; it did not say it would be unreasonable to think
such conduct legal, especially if one were not familiar with the
opinion itself. Perhaps the jury would discredit the officer's
testimony in any event; but the point is that traditional doctrine
would not have allowed him that chance.
One real impact of Bivens, then, will be in its "clearing the
books" in civil suits against police officials of law developed in
motions to suppress in criminal prosecutions. The defendant in a
civil case can get issues to the jury which would be decided by
the judge in a criminal prosecution.".
The Supreme Court has thus far given no approval of the
Bivens interpretation of Pierson v. Ray. Although the Pierson
language was quoted with approval in Scheuer v. Rhodes,'" the
Second Circuit opinion in Bivens on remand was neither cited
nor discussed. The Scheuer case involved the liability of a state
governor and lesser officials, including members of the National
109.

See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).

110.

417 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1969).

111. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1348 (2d Cir. 1972) (concurring opinion); Boscarino v. Nelson, 377 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D. Wisc. 1974); Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585, 593-94 (D. Minn. 1973); Bowens v. Knazze, 237
F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1965). The new theory may also make close cases
more susceptible to the granting of summary judgment for the defendant.
See Brubaker v. King, 505 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1974); Tritsis v. Backer,
501 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1974).
It has never been seriously suggested that Pierson or its interpretation in Bivens should be applied in motions to suppress in criminal
cases, although the Supreme Court may address this issue in Stone v.
Powell, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3681 (U.S.
June 24, 1975).
112. 416 U.S. 232, 245 (1974).
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Guard, for the shooting deaths of several students on the Kent
State campus during a period of claimed insurrection. The primary thrust of this case is that such state officials, contrary to
their assertion, do not have complete executive immunity for
their actions; complete immunity given to any state officials
would defeat the policy behind section 1983. Rather, state officers
must act reasonably and in good faith during a time of insurrection. Traditionally, however, the federal courts have considered
1. 3
the use of military force during civil insurrections sui generis.
An opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes approved arrest on less than
probable cause in that situation.1 1 4 Scheuer, then, continues a
line of cases proceeding along a different route from that pursued by Pierson.1 5
113. The Scheuer Court emphasized this unique aspect of the case:
[!T]he decision to invoke military power has traditionally been
viewed with suspicion and skepticism since it often involves the
temporary suspension of some of our most cherished rights..

Decisions in such situations are more likely than not to arise in
an atmosphere of confusion, ambiguity, and swiftly moving
events.... In short, since the options which a chief executive
and his principal subordinates must consider are far broader and
far more subtle than those made by officials with less responsibility, the range of discretion must be comparably broad.
Id. at 246-47. Thus, the Court held, the Pierson defense of "good faith
and probable cause" was not applicable in a situation involving the civil
use of military force. Id. at 245-46. Rather,
in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of
the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office
and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the
time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is
the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the
time and in light of all circumstances, coupled with a good-faith
belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive
officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.
Id. at 247-48. Cf. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 330-31 (1975) (dissenting opinion).
114. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
115. Nonetheless, the lower courts have focused solely on the "good
faith" language of the opinion. In Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59
(9th Cir. 1974), a justice of the peace stepped down from the bench and
severely battered the plaintiff in open court and in the adjoining corridor when the plaintiff refused to leave the courtroom, although the plaintiff was engaging in no breach of the peace. Finding no judicial immunity, the court nonetheless suggested that the defendant was entitled to
his Scheuer defense of "good faith while using excessive force." Id. at
65. (The award of punitive damages, however, cured whatever error in
the instructions there may have been.) It is difficult to comprehend to
what points the judge's good faith might have extended: to his belief
that he was not inflicting severe injury on the plaintiff? To his belief
that his status as judge gave him license to commit battery without fear
of legal consequences? To his belief that, even though he had already
removed plaintiff from a place where plaintiff had no right to be, he
could nonetheless punish and retaliate against the latter? A saloon-
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Nor does the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in Wood
1 6 give any support to the view of the court
v. Strickland"
of
appeals in Bivens. In Wood, two girls had been expelled from high
school by the defendant school board members for "spiking" the
punch at a school-sponsored gathering in violation of school rules
prohibiting the use or possession of intoxicating beverages at
school or school activities. The expelled students then sued the
school board members for monetary and injunctive relief under
section 1983, alleging infringement of their constitutional rights
to due process. After the jury could not come to a verdict, the
trial court had granted a judgment as a matter of law for the
defendants." 7 On review, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit passed over the students' claim that they had not been
afforded procedural due process." 8 Nonetheless, the court decided that the students had been denied substantive due process
because there was no evidence that the malt liquor which they
had added to the punch was an "intoxicating beverage" prohibited by the school rules." 9 The court of appeals held that the
purely subjective good faith of the board members would not
insulate them from liability for this denial of substantive due
process.
The Supreme Court, on certiorari, agreed that the board
members had a qualified good faith immunity. It further agreed
with the appellate court that absence of actual malice was not a
sufficient defense:
The official must himself be acting sincerely and with a belief

that he is doing right, but an act violating a student's consti-

tutional rights can be no more justified by ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable law on the part of one entrusted
with supervision 120
of students' daily lives than by the presence
of actual malice.

The Court, although not holding that substantive due process
need be accorded in school expulsion cases, did hold that the
keeper who ejected a patron and then beat him up in the street for good
measure would receive no solicitous consideration of his good faith.
Why should the defendant in this case have possibly fared any better?
See also Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1975).
116. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
117. Strickland v. Inlow, 348 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Ark. 1972).
118. Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 190 (8th Cir. 1973). The court
noted, without holding, that while the plaintiffs had been expelled without being allowed to appear before the school board, this defect may
have been cured by their appearance at a subsequent school board meeting. Id. at 190.
119. 485 F.2d at 190. See also Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199
(1960).
120. 420 U.S. at 321.
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students had been granted substantive due process. Finding that
under the school regulations, "intoxicating beverage" meant alcoholic beverage, the Supreme Court concluded that there was
sufficient evidence that the malt liquor was an alcoholic beverage
to justify the expulsions. Since it regarded procedural due
process an indisputable legal right, however, the Court remanded
for further proceedings on the procedural due process issue
which the court of appeals had side-stepped.
The decision is remarkable for its insistence that the defense
formulated in this section 1983 action parallels the defense accorded at common law.1 2 1 Once again, the Court explicitly acknowledges and continues its search for the relevant doctrine in
the common-law cases that arose in similar fact situations. Moreover, the Court stresses that "good faith" is not purely subjective.
One must believe that he is acting properly; there must be no
actual malice. Ignorance of well-settled legal rights, however,
will provide no defense even to those with the purest motivation
for their objectionable conduct.
There is, of course, the negative implication that a pure heart
and ignorance of not-so-settled legal rights may render the school
official immune from suit. Nonetheless, it may not be confidently
predicted that this implication will be given an expansive interpretation for the school administrator's benefit. For example, the
Court regarded procedural due process in an expulsion hearing
22,
as a "settled" right, even though its decision in Goss v. Lopez
established that right only one month before the opinion in
Wood-and thus long after the incident prompting the Wood law123
suit. No doubt Supreme Court decisions in analogous settings
and lower court decisions on the issue might have justified an
informed prediction of Goss,1 24 but they hardly "'settled" the

issue in any strict sense, especially for nonlawyer school officials. Moreover, it is informative to notice the Court's method in
determining that substantive due process had been granted. The
Court asked whether this right had been accorded, and not
whether the board members reasonably concluded, in light of the
rather open-ended nature of substantive due process, that they
had accorded it. Wood therefore implies that, should the legal
right to substantive due process exist, the board members would
121. Id. at 318 & n.9.
122. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Moreover, it is noteworthy that Goss dealt
with suspensions rather than expulsions.
123. See id.at 573.
124. See id. at 576 n.8.
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be required to apply this principle in an accurate fashion to the
specific facts presented.2 5
Finally, even though there may be some unspecified tolerance for school officials who act in ignorance of the law, Wood
does not indicate that it enlarges the permissible limits of a police
officer's ignorance of the law beyond the narrow ones approved in
Pierson. Wood makes no mention of the Bivens development.
Indeed, the Wood Court stresses that its decision is rooted "in the
specific context of school discipline."1 2 6 This circumscribed holding accurately reflects the state of the common law. Unlike many
other executive officials, police officers have no general immunity, even of a qualified variety.1 27 Centuries of development have
resulted in narrow, specific rules of privilege. The defenses accorded other executive officials, especially in cases where the
rights themselves are only recently being recognized, do not
28
affect the police officer's rules of privilege.
As we have seen, then, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Bivens distorted the common law to reach what it
deemed to be a desirable result. For that reason its opinion may
not be accepted by state courts as an authoritative statement of
an appropriate defense to police trespass suits.

29

It is, after all,

125. See 420 U.S. at 326 ("there was evidence supporting the charge
against respondents" (emphasis in original)).

126. Id. at 322.
127. See W. PROSSER, A HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 132 (4th
ed. 1971); Mathes & Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity
for Police Officers in Damage Actions, 53 GEo. L.J. 889, 896 (1965). See
generally Note, The Defense of "Good Faith" Under Section 1983, 1971
WAsH. U.L.Q. 666.

128. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975); Black v.
Brown, 513 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1975); Hoitt v. Vitek, 497 F.2d 598, 601-02
& n.3 (1st Cir. 1974); Bell v. Wolff, 496 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1974). See
also Schott v. Fornuff, 515 F.2d 344 (4th Cir. 1975). In O'Connor, the
Court remanded to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to determine whether the administrator of a state mental hospital should have
been accorded a "good faith" instruction. In the course of its opinion,
the Court declared that a person not dangerous to himself or others
may not be confined, even under a court order, pursuant to statute,
finding him "mentally ill." By its remand, the Court suggested this
constitutional right to be of such novelty that the defendant, in this suit
for damages, might not be accountable unless he bore malice against
the plaintiff. The jury's award of punitive damages, however, undercuts the defendant's argument that he acted in good faith and was
entitled to an appropriate instruction. See Gregory v. Thompson, 500
F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974), discussed in note 115 supra. Once again, the
Court made no mention of Bivens, no doubt for the reasons suggested
in text accompanying notes 127-28 infra.
129. At least one state, however, has by statute adopted an approach
similar to that of Bivens. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 847(b) (West 1970).
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easy to understand the ready acceptance of that Second Circuit
opinion by the federal judiciary,130 which has long been uncertain as to whether these essentially local suits should be allowed
to gain concurrent entrance into the federal courts by use of the
section 1983 label; 13' the state courts, untroubled by such considerations, may not so readily embrace the Bivens solution. The
decision, however, does attempt to deal with another problem
that must vex state as well as federal judges. It is easy to conjure
up, as did the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,

32

a

situation where a criminal, brought to justice by a constable
whose nose for wrongdoing is keener than his knowledge of the
law, escapes from his plight by employing a sharp lawyer to free
him on a "technicality." Then, claiming the victor's spoils, he
institutes a civil damage suit against the hapless officer, recovering a substantial judgment. In such a case, the simple, yet
deceptive, solution which is presented by Bivens to this perceived
injustice could easily gain currency.
This solicitude for the officer' 33 in what has to be an infrequent situation, 34 however, strips the totally innocent citizen, as
Obviously, a federal court willing to accept Bivens as a statement of "the
common law" will apply this doctrine to whatever state claims of police
misconduct are pendent to the federal claims. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit has already applied its Bivens holding in diversity
litigation, even as to parties not police officers. Fleming v. McEnany,
491 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1974). Compare the rigorous approach of Merritt

v. St. Paul, 11 Minn. 145 (1866), cited in note 16 supra. But see Anderson

v. De Cristofalo, 494 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1974).
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has seized upon Bivens
and its interpretation of Pierson to reward ignorance of the law in a

fairly wide range of contexts.

Compare Skinner v. Spellman, 480 F.2d

539 (4th Cir. 1973), with Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973).
130. A number of other courts have added their approval to the
Bivens approach. See Fidtler v. Rundle, 497 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1974);
Hoitt v. Vitek, 497 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1974); Bell v. Wolff, 496 F.2d 1252
(8th Cir. 1974); Hill v. Rowland, 474 F.2d 1374 (4th Cir. 1973); Rodriguez
v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1974) (Bivens approved, but actual compliance with common-law privilege rules determined); Jones v. Perrigan,
459 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1972) (dictum); Tritsis v. Backer, 355 F. Supp. 225

(N.D. Ill. 1973); Richardson v. Snow, 340 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Md. 1972).
131. See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
132. 456 F.2d at 1347, 1348.
133. Solicitude for those ignorant of the law has been extended to
others besides police officers-even those, like lawyers, who can realisti-

cally be expected to know the law. Tucker v. Maher, 497 F.2d 1309 (2d
Cir. 1974); Fleming v. McEnany, 491 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1974).
134. But see Bowens v. Knazze, 237 F. Supp. 826 (N D. 31l. 1965) (liability denied). An officer had made a valid arrest of the plaintiff's wife
on a public sidewalk. He then frisked the plaintiff for a weapon and
found none. Later he made a more thorough search and found a small

envelope of heroin in the plaintiff's pants. The plaintiff sued under see-
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well as the wrongdoer, of a meaningful protection from invasion of liberties. Only in the most flagrant cases of physical
brutality inflicted on a totally innocent person can any effective
control over the police be expected under the Biven standard.135
Moreover, given the view of the Bivens court that constitutional
guidelines are excessively complex, 3 6 almost all claims of ignorance of the law must be given a receptive ear. Such permissiveness
will not only reward incompetence, but also invite perju137
ryT.

POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE BIVENS STANDARD

A formidable criticism made against an objective standard is
the argument that the guidelines of criminal procedure are complex and vague, thus making conformance difficult for the police
officer. As observed in Bivens, the legal guidelines to which he
must conform his conduct are often intricate, sometimes in a
process of change, and sometimes, because of the recurring emphasis on a "reasonableness" standard, of an open-ended nature.
Moreover, when confronted with a quickly changing situation,
the officer may be hard-pressed to apply those guidelines accurately. After some reflection, however, one must wonder whether
it is the police officers who are expecting too much of the courts,
and not the reverse. If automobile drivers were to complain that
their state's motor vehicle code not only had too many provisions
tion 1983 for the second, illegal search after his criminal conviction had
been reversed in People v. Bowen, 29 Ill. 2d 349, 194 N.E.2d 316 (1963).
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs section 1983 complaint,
reasoning that the propriety of a "double search" had never been considered by the fllinois Supreme Court. Hence, the officer could reasonably
believe that he acted lawfully. The officer's actions, said the court, were
in no way negligent.
One wonders how the notion of negligence can creep into the analysis of an intentional tort, especially in light of the Supreme Court's language in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). More importantly,
the defendant police officer should not have found it necessary for the
fllinois Supreme Court to tell him that arrest of one person on a public
sidewalk does not justify search beyond a frisk of all persons near the
arrestee. His protestations of ignorance and lack of guidance are somewhat feeble, to say the least. The district judge's observation that the
state court had made no prior decisions on this point should have cut
the opposite way.
See also Daly v. Pedersen, 278 F. Supp. 88 (D. Minn. 1967); Quinnette v. Garland, 277 F. Supp. 999 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
135. Compare Hill v. Rowland, 474 F.2d 1374 (4th Cir. 1973), with
Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970).
136. 456 F.2d at 1348.
137. See generally Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26
STAN. L. REv. 1027, 1044-45 (1974).
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(upon any one of which might be predicated a finding of negligent conduct), but also left too many crucial questions with less
than rigid answers, would courts or the legislature be moved to
dispense with these rules? In fact, any state's motor vehicle code
could be subject to such complaints. 1 8 Yet the real damage done
by those who depart from its objective, albeit imperfect, standards provides a sound basis for unswerving adherence to a
liability system not tempered by consideration of the tortfeasor's
subjective state of mind.139
138. Police officers receive no special consideration when they operate motor vehicles. Consider, for example, UNroIRM VEmCrc CoDn § 11106 (1968):
(a) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call or when in the pursuit
of an actual or suspected violator of the law or when
responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm,
may exercise the privileges set forth in this section, but
subject to the conditions herein stated.
(b) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may:
1. Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this
chapter;
2. Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but
only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe
operation;
3. Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as he does
not endanger life or property;
4. Disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning in specified directions.
(c) The exemptions herein granted to an authorized emergency vehicle shall apply only when such vehicle is
making use of an audible signal meeting the requirements of § 12-401(d) and visual signals meeting the requirements of § 12-218 of this act, except that an authorized emergency vehicle operated as a police vehicle
need not be equipped with or display a red light visible
from in front of the vehicle.
(d) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of
an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to
drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor
shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of
others.
Moreover, the case law abounds with instances where police officers have
been held liable for negligent operation of motor vehicles, even though
their conduct required some close judgmental decisions. Never is there a
suggestion that the police officer's subjective state of mind should lessen
his liability under the sometimes technical, sometimes open-ended standards that regulate the operation of motor vehicles. See, e.g., Myers v.
Town of Harrison, 438 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1971); Reed v. City of Winter
Park, 253 So. 2d 475 (Fla. App. 1971); Sundin v. Hughes, 107 Il. App.
2d 195, 246 N.E.2d 100 (1969); Cotten v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 211 So.
2d 110 (La. App. 1968); Thain v. City of New York, 30 N.Y.2d 524, 280
N.E.2d 892, 330 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1972).
139. Insistence on a purely subjective standard, moreover, may be
thought to be too radical an approach even when dealing with conduct
legal at the time of its performance but illegal at the time of a civil
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There remains a question as to whether the civil damage
remedy is necessary where the police officer reasonably believed
his actions to be legally justified. Perhaps, in the minds of some,
deprivation of liberty or interference with enjoyment of one's
property is not thought to be injurious; only the addition of a
subjective element of malice would produce injury. At common
law, however, personal freedom, personal security, and personal
enjoyment of property were considered to be important rightshence, the existence of trespass actions with only narrow, limited
privileges available as defenses. Injury was presumed to flow
from interference with these rights; there was no need to present
doctor bills or repair bills to make a case for damages. If an
innocent man were arrested without probable cause, it was
deemed an affront to his sensibilities and a transgression of an
important civil right.140 If his house were ransacked, it was an
outrage perpetrated on his enjoyment of property. 141 He was not
expected to suffer this sort of indignity meekly as his involuntary contribution to society's quest for law and order. The mental
state or malice of the tortfeasor did not detract from the wrong,
although it would determine the propriety of punitive damages. 142 Even though not a bruise was inflicted nor a board

broken, there was injury and damage to important rights in
every false arrest and illegal search.
The suggestion that the officer's state of mind could
mitigate the wrong inflicted by his violation of the guidelines on
arrest, search, and seizure implies that these rights are not really
important. If the guidelines are meaningless technicalities, the
violation of which does not result in any real harm, then of
course an "I-didn't-mean-to" defense, the approximate equivalent
of an apology, should suffice to assuage the wounded feelings of
the innocent man who has been arrested or has seen his house
action for damages. Courts have not hesitated to make their constitutional decisions prospective only when formulating new legal standards
to govern motions to suppress. But a ruling that a particular decision
is prospective only has never been thought to dispense with an objective
appreciation of the previous standards, untouched by the prospectiveonly ruling. Cf. Black v. Brown, 513 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1975). The
seminal case on retroactivity is Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
For an able criticism of this case and the doctrine it has spawned, see
Haddad, "Retroactivity Should Be Rethought": A Call for the End of
the Linkletter Doctrine,60 J. Cam. L.C. &P.S. 417 (1969).
140. See Christie v. Leachinsky, [1947] A.C. 573.
141. See Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807
(K.B. 1765).
142. See Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266 (1879).
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torn apart. Viewed as mere rules of etiquette, the guidelines
hardly seem worthy of a damage action when they are breached.
Since, however, application of these guidelines often results in
the freeing of dangerous criminals, it is difficult to believe that
the courts could attribute so little importance to them in the
context of civil damage actions. Rather, as implied in Bivens,
there may be a reluctance on the part of the courts to redress
violation of these guidelines with multiple remedies-a civil damage action as well as the suppression of evidence and probable
dismissal of charges in a criminal trial. For some time, the civil
damage action was the only remedy for the violation of these
rules; the motion to suppress is a relatively recent development.143

If the exclusionary rule were found to have a con-

stitutional basis,14 4 the courts might then deem this one remedy sufficient and desire to dispense with the older one.
In cases where the police have obtained incriminating evidence through illegal tactics, the availability of the motion to
suppress may well be remedy enough for the individual deprived
of his constitutional rights. There is no requirement, constitutional or otherwise, that an individual have more than one remedy. Avoiding a criminal conviction or substantially lessening its
likelihood should provide sufficient recompense for a deprivation
of constitutional rights. Although, on a motion to suppress, the
police may not justify their action by pointing to the fruits of
that conduct, it is not unreasonable for them to refer to those
fruits in a later damage action. In the latter context, the fruits of
their conduct would not indicate its legality, but rather the
inappropriateness of an additional remedy such as the civil dam5
age action.

14

143. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

144. See generally Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MNN. L. REv. 251

(1974); cf. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MXwN. L. Rnv. 349, 432-33 (1974).
145. It is conceivable that the police could make an illegal arrest
of a guilty person, but not gain any incriminating evidence through their
conduct. Should this individual have an action for damages? 1 HARPER
& JAMEs, supra note 4, § 3.18, at 280-81, think not. In this situation,

however, the arrestee has no remedy in the context of a criminal trial
for this deprivation of his rights. The exclusionary rule excludes evidence; it does not directly give the arrestee his freedom. An illegal arrest does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the arrestee or impede
his prosecution. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). To deny
the civil damage action in this sort of case leaves the arrestee without
any redress for deprivation of his right to personal freedom.
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Where, however, illegal acts result in the production of no
incriminating evidence, the Bivens formula deprives the innocent
victim of any remedy. Thus, dissatisfaction of a different sort
with the civil damage action must also underlie the Bivens approach. This may be found in the honest, understandable sympathy which exists for the offending officers. Their employerscity, state, or federal governments-insist on aggressive police
work and reap from it the benefits of law and order. When the
officers overstep the boundary between aggressive police work
and illegal police work, however, those same employers often
cannot be made to assume responsibility.146 The tort liability
thus rests exclusively with the officer, who is almost always financially unable to shoulder the weight. 14 7 Were the governmental employer to assume joint and several liability with the employee, we might witness less reluctance by the courts to enforce
for the innocent those rights which are considered so important
that even the guilty receive their protection.
Watering down the damage action against the officer, however, gives no incentive for the government to accept responsibility for that officer's actions. The courts are unlikely to impose
liability on the governmental employer without statutory authority, 148 but they also should be reluctant to change a wellestablished common-law doctrine so as to lessen the employee's
exposure to liability, for such a change may thereby destroy an
important incentive for legislative change of the government's
duty. 4 9 Only if the civil suit for damages is a reasonably potent
weapon will governmental employers be stimulated to assume
their proper responsibility. Bivens and its progeny' 50 unfortu146. See Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEx.
L. REV. 703, 718 & n.38 (1974). Recently, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970)
was amended by Act of March 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50,
to allow suit against the federal government for certain intentional torts
of its law enforcement agents.
Some states do provide indemnity to officers against whom a judgment has already been rendered. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 14-5, -6 (1973); Wis. STAT. AN. § 285.06 (Supp. 1974-75).
147. See Mathes & Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in Damage Actions, 53 GEo. L.J. 889, 907-08
(1965).
148. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a
Sword, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1532, 1556-59 (1972), makes the argument that
the courts should consider the abolition of government immunity for intentional police torts. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Moor v.
County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), indicates that the judiciary will
likely leave this delicate task to the legislative branch.
149. See Dellinger, supra note 148, at 1556.
150. See note 130 supra.
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nately remove any pressure upon them to take on that responsi-

bility.
The common law has wisely held police officers to a higher
standard. They must act legally, not merely think they are acting
legally. Monroe opted for this higher standard when it declared
that section 1983 actions "should be read against the background
of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural
consequences of his actions."1' Had the Court wanted to take
into account the officer's perceptions of the legality of his conduct, it would have required a specific intent to violate the
plaintiff's rights as it has under the statute which is the penal
counterpart of section 1983.152 The Pierson Court thus reaffirmed
the desire that section 1983 actions be litigated under the rules
and framework developed for common-law trespass actions, even
going so far as to adopt a minor inconsistency within the common
law.
Bivens, however, has in a relatively short period of time
influenced the lower courts to temper their application of common-law privilege rules in section 1983 actions. Officers need only
reasonably believe that they acted legally, a requirement forged
in the realization that the law has become too complicated for an
officer to apply accurately. Thus, the appearance of privilege has
been substituted for privilege itself. Those privileges not dependent on appearances would have to be radically altered to conform with the apparent Bivens view that all privileges are homogeneous-good faith and reasonable belief. Moreover, as Mattis v.
Schnarr demonstrates, even unconstitutional state statutes can
provide the officers a substantial defense. 53 Although state law
may not override the Constitution, an officer's reliance on state
law may override a citizen's constitutional rights. No longer is
the officer required to draw fine lines.
There is no doubt that the federal courts do have the power
to fashion privilege rules that differ from those of the common
law in actions against police officers which arise under federal
law, if they determine that the Constitution would thereby be
better served. 5 4 Monroe, Pierson, and Wood, however, indicate
151.
152.
153.
154.
Howell

365 U.S. at 187.
See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
See Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607-08 (7th Cir. 1973);
v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 278-79 (3d Cir. 1972); cf. Caperci v. Hun-

toon, 397 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1968). See also Hill, The Law-Making Power

of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 CoLmw. L. REV.
1024, 1026-27 (1967). No doubt pendent claims under state law could
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that the basic themes to be developed by the lower federal courts
are those of the common law, which, in the area of police torts,
embody values written into the Bill of Rights.'5 5 By focusing on
the defendant officer's mental processes, Bivens follows a path
which was impliedly rejected by Monroe.
This experiment by the lower courts is therefore not justified by precedent; nor is it good policy. The range of devices
available to deter illegal police conduct will be effectively narrowed, thereby putting more pressure on the exclusionary rulethe deterrent value of which has been widely questioned, 156 even
when used in conjunction with other remedial devices. Moreover,
those most deserving of relief from police excesses-persons who
are innocent of any wrongdoing, and thus without an opportunity to invoke the exclusionary rule-will be deprived of their only
effective remedy. Finally, the courts must now not only develop
constitutional law, but also set standards within which juries
may find reasonable ignorance of constitutional law, a task never
assumed in any other area of tort law. 151 For these reasons,
therefore, the United States Supreme Court should be loathe to
approve the doctrine developed in the lower courts, a development which it has previously refused to sanction.
be governed by federal law if the officer is a federal one. See generally
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). However, pendent claims against
state officials would seem to be governed by the content of state law.
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). Nonetheless, if one
takes the blithe view that the rule announced in Bivens does not differ
from traditional doctrine, this problem, like the others already discussed,
does not arise. Cf. Fleming v. McEnany, 491 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1974).
155. See text accompanying notes 27-28, 50, 121 supra.
156. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411-27 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
157. The Supreme Court may have authorized just such a procedure in motions to suppress evidence in criminal cases, where the officers' conduct has violated legal guidelines, but there is some question
as to whether those guidelines were formulated only after the conduct
in question. See United States v. Peltier, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 2321 (1975)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Significantly, Peltier, in its approach to the
retroactivity problem, see note 139 supra, makes no mention of Pierson
or Bivens. It focuses not on sympathy for the officer "mulcted in damages," as was the concern in Pierson, a civil case, but rather on the
imperative of judicial integrity and deterrence of lawless action, neither of which it envisioned as being harmed by an inquiry into what
the officer should have known. The holding is limited to criminal cases
where there is uncertainty as to whether the law substantially changed
after the conduct in question and where, if it did, the change would be
prospective only. Justice Brennan voiced fears in his dissent, however,
that the majority opinion "forecasts the complete demise of the exclusionary rule." Id. at 2324.

